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The Industrial Revolution is seen as a major turning point in the management of 
labour, bringing about employment practices that gave structure and stability to the 
workforce. This paper provides evidence that employers were using hiring and 
retention strategies to stabilize the unskilled workforce at least a century before 
industrialization. We exploit the comprehensive employment records that survive from 
the rebuilding of St. Paul’s Cathedral in London (1672–1748) to reconstruct and 
analyse the employment history of over one thousand general building labourers, the 
benchmark category of unskilled workers for economic historians. We show that St. 
Paul’s was able to stabilize its workforce by establishing a core group of long-standing 
workers. Tenure was incentivized with more days of work each month on the site, 
priority in the queue for retention and rehiring in periods of low labour demand, and 
the opportunity to earn additional income as watchmen. These strategies reduced 
turnover and may have allowed the Cathedral to retain the most productive workers, 




Just over 350 years ago, St. Paul’s Cathedral was destroyed in the Great Fire of London. Under 
the guidance of Sir Christopher Wren, the Cathedral was entirely rebuilt between 1672 and 1711 
into the baroque masterpiece that stands today. This pre-industrial mega-project left not only a 
legacy on the London skyline, but also detailed individual-level records of the employment and 
remuneration of building labourers. With these records, unparalleled in continuity and scope for 
this period, we reconstruct and analyse the employment histories of over one thousand workers 
employed during a seventy-year period. We find that the project structured employment in order 
 
1 The authors thank Dr Kate Osborne for the sort of accurate and careful data input that only an expert on the early 
modern period can provide. We are grateful to participants at the EHS conference in Keele 2018, at the Campop 
brown coffee 2018, at the Economic History seminar at Universidad Carlos III October 2019, at UCD Economics 
seminar November 2019, at the Facing Inequality Seminar at George Washington University, at the LSE Economic 
History seminar in June 2020, and at the Queens University Belfast Economic History Seminar November 2020, as 
well as Suresh Naidu, Jason Lennard, David Chilosi, Noam Yuchtman, and others for comments ideas and critiques 
which improved our research.   
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to retain workers and to reduce turnover, giving a core group of labourers more work, priority in 
rehiring after slowdowns, and access to additional ways to earn. Despite the volatility that 
characterized pre-industrial labour demand, these strategies meant that St. Paul’s was able to 
establish a stable workforce by incentivizing tenure and rewarding longstanding labourers. 
Uncovering this type of labour management practice in the seventeenth century challenges the 
standard connection between industrialisation, advanced capitalism and firm-level labour 
retention strategies. 
 
In analyses of labour relations and management, the Industrial Revolution is seen as a turning 
point which eradicated centuries old customs (Polyani 1957; Hobsbawm 1968; Berg 1980; 
Landes 1986; Clark 1994; Szostak 1989; Thompson 1963; Pollard 1965), precipitated the modern 
management revolution of corporate scale and scope (Chandler 1977), and brought 
institutionalisation and stability to employment  relations through new hierarchies and new legal 
and contractual restrictions (Seltzer and Sammartino 2009; Howlett 2004; Naidu and Yuchtman 
2013; Craven and Hay 1994: Clark 1994). In the period before industrialisation, unskilled labour 
is often assumed to have been allocated through spot or auction markets in which casual and 
unskilled employment entered transient, short-term contracts (Scholliers 2003; Grantham 2004; 
Williamson 1987; Rule 1981, Wallis 2014). Despite a large body of work that uses wages as a 
proxy for economic growth in this period (Allen 2001, 2009; Clark 2005, 2007; Van Zanden 
1999, 2009), the development of hiring, supervision and personnel management remain largely 
unstudied (Pollard 1965; Thompson & Wilson 2006; Huberman 1996; cf Chandler 1977:52-54). 
However, increasingly, economic historians concerned with labour markets are becoming more 
interested in varying types of employment contract and duration of employment (Humphries & 
Weisdorf 2019).  
 
Our study makes a novel contribution by offering the first in-depth analysis of actual pre-
industrial hiring practices in construction work in England. We examine the characteristics of 
hiring at St. Paul’s Cathedral through the main period of construction, 1672-1711, and for 
workers retained for maintenance until 1748. Our digitized employment records encompass 
almost every day that general labourers worked at the Cathedral over these 76 years. These data 
are unusual not only because of the architectural distinction of the building on which the 
labourers toiled, but also because the Cathedral’s accounting records listed each labourer’s name. 
We can therefore reconstruct the individual employment histories of 1,011 general labourers 
during the Cathedral’s construction and maintenance period.  With this unique longitudinal 
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dataset, we are able to identify individual labourer’s days worked, earnings, absences, and 
duration of employment. We then explore econometrically the relationship between tenure and 
the number of days of work awarded, the consistency of employment, and access to additional 
income earning opportunities. 
 
Our results indicate that St. Paul’s was able to stabilize its workforce by incentivizing and 
rewarding tenure. The Cathedral privileged a core group of workers whose access to additional 
and more consistent income increased with tenure. These core labourers were given more days 
of work each month than others—workers with the most tenure were more than three times as 
likely as those with the least tenure to be fully employed for a month. We also find that these 
tenured labourers had more consistent access to employment. Longstanding labourers were less 
likely to have periods in the year in which they were not hired at all and were also more likely to 
be rehired after seasonal breaks in construction. Finally, the labourers with the most tenure were 
twice as likely as newer labourers to be given the benefit of additional shifts as watchmen, which 
increased earnings in a month by up to 15 percent. These results indicate that St. Paul’s pursued 
management strategies to reduce turnover or to retain the most productive workers, much earlier 
than is usually thought. 
 
Our findings for unskilled labourers complement an emerging body of work identifying 
institutional adaptability in the economy and organizational innovation in skilled labour markets 
in the centuries before the industrial revolution (de La Croix et al. 2016; Kelly & O’Grada 2014). 
Recent studies have argued that large organizations operating in a pre-industrial context were 
capable of creating internal labour markets for skilled workers (López Losa and Garcia-Zuniga 
2020; Murphy 2010, 2015). In a similar vein, studies have revealed strong performance-related 
incentives in eighteenth century navies (Allen 2002). That a Cathedral should introduce similar 
mechanisms is consistent with arguments about the creative potential of early-modern 
administrative elites in the face of shocks (Dittmar & Meisenzahl 2020) and novel challenges in 
scale and scope (Harris 2020).  
 
The case also speaks to contemporary research in labour economics which seeks to understand 
the source and effects of labour market frictions, particularly those of recruitment and retention 
costs and associated employer power (Manning 2011; Falch 2010; Dube et al 2010, Dube et al 
2020, Azar Berry Marinescu 2019; Naidu et al 2018), and which considers supply elasticity in 
response to factors other than the wage (Machin and Manning 2004; Naidu and Yuchtman 2013 
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pp.111-113; Bhaskar et al 2002; Staiger et al 2010). Our results suggest that institutional or firm 
level responses to these problems are not entirely modern management strategies, but have long 
run antecedents, and highlight the value of duration of employment or security of tenure in early 
modern employment contracts. Our findings may also be relevant the sources of monopsony in 
today’s advanced and developing markets (Abebe et al 2018).  
 
We also contribute to ongoing debates about labour’s share of income and living standards in 
the long run. The economic history literature typically assumes that unskilled, manual labourers 
such as the construction workers at St. Paul’s were homogenous and interchangeable, rewarded 
with the same wage. Our data does show that the day wage at St Pauls was the same for 70 years, 
but the core group of longstanding labourers at the Cathedral received an income premium 
through additional shifts and greater consistency of employment that was inaccessible to 
newcomers. In other words, labourers’ incomes were not as homogenous as their wages imply. If 
income was a function of tenure, this raises questions about how to derive annual earnings or 
estimate standards of living from building labourers’ day wage series, a process that is central to 
several common methods for understanding long run growth (Allen 2001; Clark 2005).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide historical background on the 
reconstruction of St. Paul’s and describe the data set sourced from the project. In Section III, we 
present descriptive statistics on employment churn and turnover the Cathedral, demonstrating 
the stabilization of St. Paul’s workforce over the construction phase. In Section IV, we analyse 
the relationship between tenure and the number of days worked each month, the consistency of 
employment, and access to watchmen shifts. Section V discusses possible motivations behind 
the Cathedral’s strategies. Section VI concludes.  
 
 
2.  Historical Context and Data  
St Paul’s was the largest construction site in London from 1675 to 1711. The Cathedral had been 
destroyed by the Great Fire of 1666, and, after several years of planning and demolition work, 
Sir Christopher Wren’s design for the new Cathedral was finally approved in 1675.  As Surveyor 
to the Crown, Wren was also responsible for the management of many other projects around the 
City of London: the City Churches, Greenwich Hospital, and, later, Westminster Abbey 
(Campbell 2007). The project took place against the backdrop of a rapidly expanding city that 
was experiencing substantial long-term growth, driven by trade and services (Broadberry et al. 
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2015), and a prolonged building boom, boosted by the architectural ambitions of the City and 
the restored Crown after the Fire (Barras 2009).  
 
The Cathedral’s accounts are exceptionally detailed and well maintained, largely because of its 
funding model.2 The rebuilding was funded by the approval of a new tax on coal imported into 
the city. Parliament and the City expected strict oversight and auditing, requiring records to 
account for all expenditures. The accounts were compiled from rough journals and call books 
that recorded weekly pay. The full accounts were counter-signed as an accurate record of wages 
and were subject to audit, giving some reassurance about their quality. The available records 
from 1672–1748 that we use cover the main period of construction to 1711, the period to 1720 
when some masonry and other work were still being carried out, and nearly three decades of 
general maintenance and upkeep of the building to 1748.  
 
Our dataset covers all 402 surviving sets of accounts from 1 October 1672 to the 24 June 1748. 
The accounts begin with the start of the reconstruction and continue after its completion, with 
labourers retained for maintenance work. There are full accounts for all periods from 1672 to 
1748 with the exception of two short breaks, lasting for two years in the construction period and 
three years in the maintenance period.3 The dataset ends with the cessation of accounts 
containing nominal data. The majority of accounts (73%) cover periods of one month. The rest 
run over longer periods, with 5% covering full years.4  The shorter duration accounts are all from 
the construction period, giving us finer grained information for that time. 
 
In each account book, the labourers who were hired directly by the Cathedral’s clerk-of-works 
were listed by name, with the number of days they worked and the rate they were paid. The 
accounts record that the labourers carried out general tasks such as moving stone, dragging 
goods, and sorting and carrying rubbish, but they also carried out demolition work; mixed 
mortar; watched doors (took deliveries); rammed and cut walls; stripped tiles and plumbing and 
assisted the specialist contractors. Their tasks included some that involved a measure of skill and 
experience, alongside brawn, but the accounts do not cover the most skilled workers on the site. 
 
2 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/313/I/B/25473 
3 October 1674 – October 1675 and June 1710 – June 1714 
4 Unfortunately, the books do not run neatly in yearly runs.  Accounts were kept quarterly at first, and then monthly 
from 1674 until January 1683. From January 1683 through April 1686, accounts were quarterly again. From April 
1686, monthly reporting resumed for a decade. Then, from October 1696 until June 1701, the Cathedral again used 
quarterly accounts. Monthly accounting restarted in June 1701 and lasted until June 1710, when bi-annual accounts 




Most specialized tasks such as brickwork, masonry, and plastering were supplied by skilled 
subcontractors who hired their own workers directly and kept separate, private accounts for 
wages. This system of general labourers working alongside skilled subcontractors was common 
in the building industry in this period.5  
 
St. Paul’s was operational every week of the year, and the normal working week was six full days, 
as at other sites in London. However, not all active labourers worked every day. The number of 
days worked and labourers hired varied with project intensity and with the seasons. The number 
of labourers employed in January was about 60% of the number employed in July. 
 
The decision of whom to hire, and other aspects of the organization of employment, were in the 
hands of the clerk-of-the-works, a position held by John Tilson until 1685 and by Lawrence 
Spencer thereafter. The clerk-of-the-works was responsible for the day-to-day co-ordination of 
materials, contractors and workers on site, cost management, and record-keeping. The clerk 
hired at will from an available pool of potential labourers. Employment seems to have been 
agreed verbally on a weekly or daily basis—there are no surviving contracts for labourers, and 
probably none ever existed. Labourers thus had no contractual expectation about ongoing 
employment, but there is ample evidence that men freely entered the employment relationship.6 
 
We extracted the labourers’ names, number of days worked, and pay from the St Paul’s account 
books for all 402 accounting periods. We identify 1,033 unique labourers whose employment 
histories on the project appear in 21,793 entries.7  4.69% of entries lacked names or were 
excluded because two active labourers share the same name.8 69 labourers are identified as 
disabled, and there are no female names in the dataset.  
 
 
5 Although the record keeping was idiosyncratic and unique, this system was found across the industry in England 
(Woodward 1995; Stephenson 2020). Trade-specific labourers hired by specialist sub-contractors worked alongside 
general labourers employed centrally at Westminster Abbey 1712-1719 and Greenwich Hospital 1696-1706. There 
are not comparable named records at either site, however. Labour organization was similar in private housebuilding 
(McKellar 1999). 
6 Some men signed for task work (see below), indicating they had the opportunity to work for others. Campbell 
2007 pp.35 -39 describes various types of work undertaken by labourers even before the rebuilding began.  
7 The small sample and consistent format allowed us to manually identify repeat appearances based on unique 
forename and surname combinations with a high degree of confidence. We restrict linkage to allow individuals a 
maximum period of absence of five years, after which we assume we are observing two same-named individuals.   
8 14 entries were unnamed; 1,022 entries are ambiguous, in that two individuals may have been active 
simultaneously, based on the repetition of names within an account. These ambiguous entries relate to 19 distinct 
names, and almost half (537) are from one, John Scott.  
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Most entries report days of labouring work, but 14% are for shifts as night watchmen on the site, 
a common practice intended to prevent trespass and theft. Labourers acted as watchmen in 
addition to their regular labouring shifts. This additional duty was potentially lucrative—a night’s 
watch paid 8d. until 1700 and 12d. thereafter, equivalent to half to two-thirds of the daily wage. 
However, the number of shifts a labourer could take was capped at two per week or ten per 
month, limiting the monthly income premium from serving as a watchman to about 15%. 
 
Labourers were paid a day rate that was almost entirely uniform across workers. During the 
winter months (late October through early March), labourers earned 16d. per day. During the 
spring, summer, and early autumn (March to early September), they earned 18d. per day. These 
rates were similar to those recorded at a number of sites around the city, including for labourers 
working directly for contractors and sub-contractors at St Paul’s.9 Thus, a labourer’s income was 
a simple function of how many days he worked. These day wage rates were nominally rigid for 
76 years despite moderate price inflation, sustained growth in GDP per capita, and sharp 
economic shocks (Allen 2009; Broadberry et al. 2015, pp. 239-242; Hatcher 1998 pp. 70, 74; 
Boulton 2000). The Cathedral spent nothing on beer, food, or other perks or provisions for 
labourers. Whilst labourers used the Cathedral’s drogues, ramps, barrows, scaffold and rope, we 
do not know whether the tools they dug with were their own or the Cathedral’s. 
 
Labouring work offered limited progression. A very small number of labourers worked as 
foremen, receiving higher wages (20 to 24d.).10 It is not clear whether foremen were always 
present, but they were used during periods in which the greatest amount of work was being 
carried out. Forty-four labourers also acted as sub-contractors for labouring tasks that required 
more skill or were more dangerous during the demolition phase of the Cathedral.11 
 
Evidence on the external labour market is limited.  We know the period under investigation saw 
a great deal of construction across the city and high labour mobility (Brett James 1935; Barras 
2009; Wrigley 1967). It is likely that labourers were able to find work at any number of building 
 
9 One contractor paid 18d. per day all year round to most of his labourers and 16d. per day to a smaller number of 
men assisting layers.  By contrast, craftsmen’s wages varied substantially between individuals (see Stephenson 2020, 
chapter 6.) 
10 Only 10 men over the 35 years of the main construction period earned above 18d. per day and all for short 
periods, associated with specialist or supervisory work.  
11 These labourers agreed task contracts worth between £1 and £150 between 1676 and 1690, acting as petty 
entrepreneurs. The contracts specified the length or volume of material to be removed, without the difficulty of the 
work being known, offering a chance for profit if it could be done in fewer days work than estimated, or loss or 
lower pay per day if not. Many of them signed their contracts, indicating relatively high human capital in a period 
where male literacy was still low. 
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sites, albeit none that equalled the scale and duration of St. Pauls.12 Construction accounted for 
about 10% of male employment in the city; the share of labourers within that is unclear. In this 
period, skilled and unskilled construction work was not subject to guild restrictions on access 
(Beier 1986), and even at the Cathedral itself, labourers were able to work directly for specialist 
contractors and suppliers.13  However, the scale and longevity of the rebuilding of the Cathedral 
offered the potential for more continuous work for labourers than they could find on specialist 
contracts or other sites. Therefore, a higher position in the queue for work at the Cathedral was a 
potentially important incentive. 
 
 
3.  Descriptive statistics on the St. Paul’s workforce 
The employment records from St. Paul’s reveal that the Cathedral was able to stabilize its 
workforce over time, despite the generally precarious nature of pre-industrial employment 
relations. Though there were large variations in demand for labourers at the Cathedral, monthly 
hiring and separation rates trended downward over the construction period, and the share of 
labourers new to the project each year strictly declined through 1710. When we explore the data 
on an individual level, large differences in the total length of time that labourers worked at the 
Cathedral emerge—some workers were employed only briefly at St. Paul’s, while other workers 
served for many years. 
 
3a Variation in demand for labour at St. Paul’s  
In addition to regular seasonal patterns, the amount of labouring work available at the Cathedral 
varied greatly throughout the construction period with multi-year peaks and troughs of labour 
demand. This high level of demand volatility is consistent with what we know of construction on 
other similar sites.14 The main driver of demand appears to be project centred. This was a period 
of sharp economic cycles, but they are only weakly associated with the pattern observed here. 
Figure 1 plots the total number of labourers on site and the number of days work they provided 
during the period of the rebuilding, from the commencement of work in 1674 to declared 
completion in 1711.15 Labourers’ work peaked three times, in the late 1670s, between 1687 and 
 
12 The surviving records of other major sites, such as Westminster Abbey and Greenwich, indicate a maximum of 10 
labourers hired per week paid on day rates. More were presumably hired on task contracts.   
13 For example, 11 of the 68 men working for the specialist mason William Kempster from 1708 to 1709 also 
worked as labourers at the Cathedral (Stephenson 2018, pp.120-121). 
14 See Stephenson 2020a pp. 50 -62; 173-192.    
15 Broadly speaking from 1667 to the late 1670s the foundations of the old cathedral were cleared, and new 
foundations laid (Campbell, 2007). From the 1680s onwards, the walls were raised and the west front and towers 
were added from 1694 to 1705. The Dome was erected and plastered between 1705 and 1709. 
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1693, and most of all between 1705 and 1709, when several years saw around 30,000 days of 
work by labourers costing the Cathedral more than £2,000 each year. By contrast the demand for 
labourers in the early 1680s was low, with annual employment at about one quarter of the level 
seen in 1676. Because construction work is stage dependant, and subject to the vagaries of 
supply chains, weather and finance, such peaks and troughs of demand are typical of any 
building site or large project.  
 
 




Source: See text 
 
3b. Stabilization of the workforce at St. Paul’s 
Despite the volatility in the amount of labour demanded by the Cathedral, over the decades in 
which the Cathedral was constructed, the workforce stabilised. We observe a downward trend in 
hiring and separation rates over the construction period, as well as a decline in the share of 




Our individual-level data permit the calculation of monthly hiring and separation rates at the 
Cathedral, following Davis et al. (2006).16 We calculate ‘all transition’ figures for each month, 
including all labourers who worked in an accounting period, no matter how long they stayed at 
the Cathedral. This means that workers who were only hired for a few days on one occasion 
count as a hire and a separation in these calculations. These figures also include temporary 
separations, as separated workers may have returned in later months.  
 
Table 1: Monthly hiring and separation rates at the Cathedral 
  Hiring Rate Separation Rate    













1675-1679 14.23 13.42 51.43 16.77 14.75 48.78 51 85.00 
1680-1684 9.79 14.83 74.19 12.34 13.32 52.83 33 55.00 
1685-1689 11.04 13.13 57.94 12.96 14.05 54.95 43 71.67 
1690-1694 8.03 6.35 34.78 5.5 7.6 38.6 50 83.33 
1695-1699 3.68 4.22 13.33 6.96 10.09 28.57 17 28.33 
1700-1704 6.41 9.48 42.11 4.69 10.55 60 42 70.00 
1705-1709 9.42 21.46 120.61 8.06 21.61 134.18 60 100.00 
Overall 9.58 14.26 120.61 9.83 15.19 134.18 295 70.24 
 
 
Table 1 reports the average hiring and separation rates for the quinquennia that cover the 
construction of the Cathedral. The hiring and separation rates can be interpreted as the percent 
of laborers who were brought on or who departed each month. Over the whole period, an 
average of about ten percent of labourers arrived or departed each month. Peak turnover was 
much higher—in some months, half or more of the workforce had not worked in the previous 
month, and in other months, a third of labourers were not employed in the following month. 
Today, construction is a high turnover industry, with worker flows three times higher than 
manufacturing firms (Davis et al. 2006, pp.7-8; US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). Even 
without the effect of firms opening and closing, the monthly job flows for St. Pauls are roughly 
twice the level seen in modern US data, where the hiring and separation rates are about 4 to 5 
per cent on average (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020).17 
 
16 Further details are in Appendix 1. These calculations are restricted to periods for which two sequential accounts 
are of one-month duration, representing 295 account books in the construction period. Quarterly and quarterly 
quasi-census calculations are included in Appendix 1. 
17 The quarterly hiring and separation rates at St. Pauls, presenting in Appendix 1, are about 17 per cent, compared 
to about 14 per cent in modern US data (Davis et al. 2006, p. 8). 
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Table 1 demonstrates that turnover trended downward over the construction period at St. Paul’s. 
From 1675 to 1680, the average hiring rate was 14%, whereas from 1705-1709, the average 
hiring rate was only 9%. Likewise, the average separation rate decreased from 17% in 1675-1680 
to 8% in 1705-1709. This downward trend in both the hiring and the separation rate at the 
Cathedral indicates that turnover declined significantly over the construction period.  
 
Because hiring and separation rates include labourers who many have been temporarily separated 
from the Cathedral, we also examine the share of labourers who joined the St. Paul’s workforce 
each year. We find that the share of labourers who had never before worked at St. Paul’s also 
declined over time. For instance, in 1687, a period of high demand, more than 80 per cent of 
labourers were new to the project. Twenty years later in 1708, the year with the largest single 
amount of work, only a quarter of labourers were new. This stabilisation of the workforce is 
demonstrated in Table 2, which presents decadal averages (after the initial five years) tracking the 
gradual decline in the share of new labourers to the project each year.  
 
Table 2.  Labourers new to the project each year 
 
 Decade 
New labourers per year (%) 
Mean number of 
labourers employed per 
year (n)  
Mean Min Max 
1675-9 40.75 12.70 79.23 116.80 
1680-9 28.88 6.25 84.66 61.30 
1690-9 27.98 13.51 46.15 47.90 
1700-9 25.40 0.00 47.83 78.80 
1710-9 10.42 0.00 29.03 20.29 
1720-9 4.44 0.00 20.00 9.20 
1730-9 10.00 0.00 25.00 4.14 
1740-9 12.96 0.00 40.00 5.11 
 
Note: the table presents decadal averages of the share of new labourers within the labouring workforce each year 
for ten-year periods from 1680, as well as the minimum and maximum annual share of new labourers observed 
within each period. For the 1670s, we exclude the initial 2 years of data, where the entire workforce is new, and 
present the average over the five-year period 1675-9. 
 
The increasing stability of the workforce was not just a function of the number of workers who 
had previously worked at St. Paul’s expanding as time passed. Given the short tenure of the great 
majority of labourers, there was no lack of labourers to rehire after the earliest years of the 
1670s, which we exclude in the calculations in Table 2. Further, the size of the pool of labourers 
who had previously worked at St. Paul’s had no effect on the hiring and separation rates 




3c. Tenure at St. Paul’s 
Our individual-level reconstructions of the employment histories of labourers at St. Paul’s allow 
us to examine differences in the length of time which individuals worked at the Cathedral. These 
differences are given in Figure 2, which includes all labourers who worked during the 
construction phase at St. Paul’s. Tenure is calculated as the amount of time between a labourer’s 
first and last appearance in the Cathedral’s account books.  
 
The patterned bars in Figure 2 give the proportion of all labourers with each length of tenure. 
14% of all labourers stayed for less than one month, and almost half of all labourers (47%) 
stayed for six months or less. This accords with historical perceptions of fleeting, precarious 
employment relations. However, at the other end of the distribution, some labourers were 
involved over much longer periods. Almost one quarter of labourers (24%) were associated with 
St. Paul’s for between one and five years. A further 12% of labourers worked at the site for over 
five years.  Overall, twelve men appear in the accounts for a period of thirty or more years, with 
one, Simon Satchell, active for 43 years in total. Thus, for some workers, labouring at St. Paul’s 
was fleeting, while for others, it was a long-standing arrangement.  
 
The vast majority of labouring days was taken by the group of longer-lasting workers. The black 
bars in Figure 2 indicate that the 12% of labourers who worked at St. Paul’s for more than five 
years conducted over 60% of all labouring days at the Cathedral during the construction period. 
The labourers who appeared only briefly at the Cathedral accounted for less than one per cent of 















Figure 2. Proportion of labourers and days worked according to length of tenure  
Source: See text 
 
The distribution of work at St. Paul’s was polarized. As is generally expected of the pre-industrial 
period, much of the labouring workforce faced enormous instability of employment, with highly 
variable demand and high turnover rates. However, some labourers were attached to the site for 
periods of several years or more, and it was this group that provided most of the labour needed 
for the reconstruction. Taken with the downward trend in the hiring and separation rate at the 
Cathedral and the decline in the share of new workers in the Cathedral’s workforce, it appears 
that St. Paul’s was able to stabilise its workforce over the forty-year construction period. 
 
 
4.  Econometric results on hiring, retention, and tenure  
Despite the volatility that characterized pre-industrial labour markets, the descriptive statistics in 
the previous section show that St. Paul’s was able to stabilize its workforce. In this section, we 
explore econometrically the hypothesis that stability was achieved by incentivizing and rewarding 
tenure, which would be consistent with this being the outcome of employer strategy. We analyse 
the relationship between tenure and the number of days of work awarded, the consistency of 
employment, and access to additional income earning opportunities. Our results indicate that the 
Cathedral privileged a core group of workers who were given priority in access to work as their 




4a.  Method 
How did labourers’ prior tenure affect their intensity of work, consistency of work, and access to 
additional earning opportunities? Our individual-level data allows us to explore these questions 
using a series of logit and conditional logit models. 
 
We capture prior tenure in these models in two ways. Our first measure is based on the 
cumulative number of days the labourer had worked at the site before the account in question. 
The absolute number of days previously worked strictly increases with time, so we model the 
cumulative days worked relative to the rest of the St. Paul’s workforce who were active at that 
each point in time. Specifically, we calculate the percentile rank of all workers who were active at 
the Cathedral during the accounting period according to their cumulative days worked up unto 
that point. This standardizes our measurement of relative prior tenure across time and over 
accounting periods of differing lengths. Our second measure is constructed in the same way, as a 
percentile rank, but is based on the elapsed time in days since the labourer first began working at 
the site. The percentile rank of elapsed time in days differs from the cumulative days worked 
because many workers had gaps in employment (seasonal or otherwise) or did not work the 
maximum number of days in prior account books.  
 
Throughout the analysis, we also exclude the first three years of the accounts, before January 
1675, to remove the attenuating effect that the earliest periods, when all workers had little 
experience, would otherwise have produced. We also limit our main analysis to the construction 
period, that ended in 1711, which saw the majority of employment. Finally, we rely on a panel 
construction of the dataset where all active workers are represented in each accounting period, 
including those given no days of work.  
 
The dependent variable in our models is always a binary indicator. In subsection b, this variable 
takes on 1 if a labourer worked over 85% of possible days in a period. In c, the dependent 
variable reflects whether a worker was not hired at all in the accounting period. Finally, in d, the 
dependent variable is whether a labourer was given watchmen shifts in additional to their general 
labouring work.  
 
Our basic model is thus a logit model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑇𝑡 +  𝜖, 
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 where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable which equals 1 if a labourer worked over 85% of possible days in a 
period (subsection b), if a labourer was given work in an accounting period (subsection c), or if a 
labourer was given a watchman shift (subsection d). 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the labourer’s tenure as a percentile 
rank of all active labourers in an accounting period, measured either by cumulative days 
previously worked or by elapsed time since beginning to work at St. Paul’s. 𝑇𝑡 are year dummies 
and 𝑀𝑡 are month dummies to control for seasonality.  
 
4b.  The Intensive Margin: Work Allocation Between Labourers  
The clerk of works hired labourers for different numbers of days in each accounting period. For 
example, in May 1687, a peak month of construction in which 71 labourers worked for 1,103 
days, John Denhurst was hired for just 1.5 days and Anthony Minshaw for 5 days. This was the 
only time Denhurst was hired, while it was Minshaw’s last appearance after eight months of 
consistent work on site. Conversely, a group of five labourers each worked for 23 days: two of 
them, John Hudson and Dan Northam, would be active for more than 20 years. The median 
labourer during the construction of the Cathedral worked 66 per cent of the days available. In 
the maintenance period, this fell to 58 per cent of the days available. This produced a substantial 
amount of potential inequality in the amount of work that labourers received, and gives us a 
simple and important test of the structure of employment at the Cathedral. If labourers were 
undifferentiated (differentiated) in the eyes of the clerk, then the amount of work they were 
given should be uncorrelated (correlated) with prior experience. In short, were long-standing 
labourers given the most work? 
 
A strong visual indication that the clerk favoured long-serving labourers when choosing who to 
hire can be found in Figure 3, which shows how the share of work given to labourers varied 
according to the time they had worked on the site. The share of work is the ratio between the 




18  To calculate this, we sum the total number of days that each labourer worked from their first to last appearance. 
We then divide this by the sum of the maximum number of labouring days worked by a labourer in each accounting 
period in which the labourer was active. Note that this analysis is conducted only for labourers in the construction 
period of the Cathedral who worked for more than one accounting period. In a small number of cases, the clerk 
recorded paying wages for more days than existed in the calendar period covered by an accounting period. These 
have been capped at the number of days in the calendar period covered, as it is unclear if they were errors, days 
worked in other periods, unidentified duplicate entries or additional over-payments. 
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The labourers who were on site for the shortest periods, between two and three months, were 
given the lowest share of work. Some of these labourers were only on site for a few days each 
month; they were truly casual labour. In contrast, labourers who were present on the site for 
longer periods, especially those for a year or more, generally worked more intensely, with a 
convergence to a mode of around 80 percent of the maximum available days.  Among the 
longest-serving labourers, those who stayed more than five years, many worked most if not all 
possible days during their tenure.  
 
For analytical simplicity, we estimate the effect of prior tenure on the probability of working 
“full-time” during a given accounting period. We define full-time generously to include anyone 
working between 85% and 100% of the maximum days any labourer was reported to have 
worked during the accounting period. In a few cases where the clerk recorded paying wages for 
more days than existed in the calendar period covered by an accounting period, we capped the 
maximum number of days at the number of days in the calendar period.  
 
Figure 3. Share of maximum work given to labourers by length of tenure at separation 
  
Source: See text 
 
A limitation of our data is that we cannot see which day in an accounting period a labourer 
began work at a Cathedral. The first time a worker is hired, the number of days they worked may 
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have been censored if they were hired after the start of the accounting period. For this reason, 
we drop the first observation of each worker. Unfortunately, this also means that we lose in this 
part of the analysis 160 individuals who only work at the Cathedral for one accounting period, as 
John Denhurst did in the example above.  
 
The three models presented in Table 3 estimate the effect of a labourer’s prior tenure, in terms 
of days worked and elapsed time at the Cathedral, on the probability of the labourer working 
full-time during the accounting period. All of the models have year fixed effects to account for 
time trends as well as month fixed effects for seasonality, with standard errors clustered at the 
individual worker level. 
 
Columns (1) and (2) give our primary results. The estimates indicate that long-standing workers 
were significantly more likely to work full-time during each accounting period. The marginal 
effects in column (2) imply that a one quartile increase in the percentile rank of a labourer’s 
tenure increases their probability of working full-time by 12.25 percentage points (p < 0.001, 25 
* 0.0049 = 0.1225). Figure 4 shows that a worker in the 10th percentile in terms of cumulative 
days worked has only a 16.9% chance of working full-time in a given period, while a worker in 
the 90th percentile has a 56.4% chance. Column (3) shows that these results are robust to the 
incorporation of labourer fixed effects, though the effect size is slightly smaller. Columns (4) and 
(5) present the results with the labourer’s elapsed time percentile rank as the independent 
variable of interest. The results for the logit model are significant and again slightly smaller, but 















Table 3: Probability of a labourer working full-time 

















(FE) - Coef 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Tenure - 
Cum. Days 
0.0267*** 0.0049*** 0.0117*    
 (0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0059)    
Tenure - 
Elap. Time 
   0.0180*** 0.0035*** 0.0092 
    (0.0026) (0.0005) (0.0068) 
Constant -3.7217***   -2.8929***   
 (0.2213)   (0.2206)   
       
Year Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Labourer 
Fixed Effects 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Num. of 
observations 
19861 19861 18921 19861 19861 18921 
Num. of 
individuals 
798   798   
Pseudo R2 0.172  0.156 0.131  0.155 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in 






Figure 4: Cumulative days worked and chance of working full-time in a given period.  
 
Source: See text 
 
The results in Table 3 strongly support the hypothesis that the Cathedral favoured longer-
standing labourers when allocating employment. This relationship is robust to alternative 
measures of allocation, including varying the threshold for ‘full-time’ and continuous measures 
of the share of work given to each labourer (Appendix B.1 and B.2). It is also robust to the 
inclusion of controls for external shocks which could have affected hiring at St. Paul’s, including 
wars, variation in temperature, mortality, and financial volatility (Appendix B.3). The relationship 
grew stronger in periods where the project was at a more critical and potentially risky stage, as 
with the construction of the Dome (Appendix C). The same pattern of preferential treatment, 
albeit weaker, persisted in the period from 1714 to 1748 among labourers hired for maintenance 
work (Appendix E).  
 
4c. The Extensive Margin: Persistence of Employment 
As well as deciding how many days to give labourers in each week, the clerk chose who would be 
hired again the next week. As the estimates of churn presented in Table 1 indicate, the Cathedral 
saw high levels of hiring and separation from month to month. This offers us a second, critical 
test of the structure of employment. If the clerk saw labourers as undifferentiated 
(differentiated), then the amount of time they had spent on the site should be uncorrelated 
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(correlated) with the probability they would be hired in the future. In short, were long-standing 
labourers more likely to be retained month by month at St. Paul’s? 
 
The consistency of employment was a pressing concern for labourers. The peaks and troughs of 
labour demand on the site (Figure 1) left few untouched. Breaks in employment at the Cathedral 
were commonplace: we can identify 840 periods of temporary separation in our panel, when a 
labourer was absent for one or more accounting period before reappearing in a later period. 
Because we do not observe separations below a month, this is likely to be an under-estimate. 
Almost all the absences (89%) we observe were for less than a year, and the median absence was 
two months (62 days). Long-serving workers did not escape periods without work—four-fifths 
of labourers employed for more than a year had at least one break in employment. 
 
Given these breaks in employment, we model how prior tenure affected whether labourers were 
hired in each accounting period. In each time period, we focus on the supply of possible 
labourers from among those individuals who were existing active workers at the Cathedral, i.e. 
those who had worked one shift at the Cathedral previously and who had not yet made their 
final appearance in the records. This population includes the 160 workers dropped from the 
analysis in the previous section who appeared in the accounts only once (p.17). These estimates 
do not speak to the choice of who to hire from outside that pool. Nor can we examine the 
determinants of a labourers’ final exit from the site. In effect, this analysis can be interpreted as 
how tenure affected the chance that workers had periods in which they were not hired from 
among the general labouring pool.   
 
In the three models presented in Table 4, the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 
if the worker was given work in an accounting period, and 0 otherwise. Our independent 
variable of interest is the percentile rank of the worker’s prior tenure among all possible existing 
workers in that period, in terms of cumulative days worked and in terms of elapsed time. As 
above, all of the models have year and month fixed effects with clustered standard errors. 
 
Our main results in (1) and (2) demonstrate that long-standing workers were more likely to be 
given work in each accounting period. Column (1) gives the coefficient estimates from a logit 
model. The marginal effects, given in column (2), indicate that a one quartile increase the 
labourer’s tenure percentile rank in terms of days worked increases the probability being given 
employment by 8.75 percentage points (p<0.001, 25 * 0.0035 = 0.0875). Figure 5 plots how the 
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probability of not being hired during a period changes with the tenure percentile rank, all else 
constant.  A worker in the 90th percentile in terms of cumulative days worked prior to a given 
accounting period had a 92.2% chance of be hired, while a worker in the 10th percentile had only 
a 64.5% chance. 
 
Table 4: Probability of a labourer working during the period 
















Logit (FE) - 
Coef 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Tenure - 
Cum. Days 
0.0260*** 0.0035*** 0.0275***    
 (0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0084)    
Tenure - 
Elap. Time 
   0.0184*** 0.0026*** 0.0440*** 
    (0.0027) (0.0004) (0.0084) 
Constant -1.0639***   -0.3757   
 (0.2196)   (0.2043)   
       
Year Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Labourer 
Fixed Effects 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Num. of 
observations 
20780 20780 17839 20780 20780 17839 
Num. of 
individuals 
955   955   
Pseudo R2 0.154  0.151 0.119  0.185 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in 
parentheses. Tenure given in percentile. 
 
Column (3) presents estimates from a conditional logit model with individual labourer fixed 
effects. The effect of the cumulative days worked percentile is robust to the inclusion of labourer 
fixed effects. Columns (4) and (5) give the coefficients and marginal effects of a logit model 
using our alternative measure of tenure percentile based on elapsed time. The effect size is 
significant but slightly smaller— a one quartile increase in the labourer’s elapsed time percentile 
rank increases the probability of being hired by 6.50 percentage points (p<0.001, 25*0.0026 =   




Figure 5: Probability of a labourer being hired during with tenure percentile rank.  
 
Source: See text  
 
The models in Table 4 indicate that long-standing workers were given more consistent 
employment at St. Paul’s. Of all active labourers, it was those with the least tenure who were 
most likely to face periods in which they were not hired. Longer-standing labourers, in contrast, 
were the last to be stood down.  
 
Suggestive evidence that these longer-term workers were prioritized by the clerk exists in the 
accounts. The order in which labourers were named indicates that hiring occurred in a sequence. 
Long-term labourers were taken on first and are listed higher in the accounts than less-tenured 
or new labourers. Table 5 gives the position in the accounts for new labourers, those who had 
worked at the Cathedral for a number of months, and those who had worked at the Cathedral 
over a year. Two-thirds of new labourers were listed in the bottom quartile of the accounts. If 
they remained on site for the next few months, they shifted up the order, but almost half were 
still in the last quartile for the rest of their first trimester on the site.19 By the time labourers had 
accrued 9–12 months of experience at the Cathedral, most were in the middle of the list. Those 
labourers who stayed for over a year were most often found in the top quarter of the clerk’s list. 
 
19 That their position in the accounts was still low after their first appearance makes it clear that these patterns were 
not just contingent on the time within the month that a labourer was first taken on. 
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These patterns suggest that the clerk possessed a clear idea about who was to be hired, enacting 
preferences for labourers who had accrued more tenure at the site. 
 
Table 5: Share of labourers in each quartile of the clerk’s list by time since entry to workforce 











0-25 3.38 3.15 7.80 12.50 14.64 31.10 
26-50 10.41 20.40 29.93 37.50 37.38 25.27 
51-75 46.27 55.19 43.84 34.34 30.37 18.20 
76-100 39.94 21.26 18.44 15.66 17.60 25.43 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 3.38 3.15 7.80 12.50 14.64 31.10 
 
Note: table reports labourers recorded in non-alphabetical accounts produced during the period of construction, 
from January 1675. For more information, see Appendix E. 
 
Many breaks in employment were a by-product of the seasonally volatile demand for labour 
during construction work. Most absences began when the Cathedral was sharply decreasing the 
numbers of labourers on site, as the arrival of winter brought the peak building period to a close. 
Almost 40 per cent began in January; another 10 per cent began in December. Those labourers 
who reappeared did so between February and June, as weather improved and work intensified. 
In the peak month of July, there was on average 1,466 days of general laboring work conducted 
by 49 labourers. In the month with the least work, January, there was about half as much labour, 
averaging 784 days of work conducted by 32 labourers. Using these seasonal patterns, we can 
probe deeper into whether work for more tenured labourers was more consistent over the 
calendar year by exploring whether they were more likely to be kept on during the winter months 
and, if they did have a seasonal break, whether they were more likely to be rehired in the spring 
than less tenured laborers. We consider specifically the month of March, which is when labor 
typically picked up again after the steep seasonal decline in January and February. 
 
In Table 6, we present two models over the sample of labourers active in the month of March in 
any year during the construction period. The first model in columns (1) and (2) explores whether 
workers with longer tenures were more likely to have worked over the seasonal downturn. The 
dependent variable is an indicator for whether the labourer had worked at the Cathedral in the 
preceding months of January and February. The positive and statistically significant coefficient in 
column (1) indicates that tenure was positively related to the probability of working in these 
months. The size of this effect is substantial—the marginal effect in column (2) indicates that a 
one quartile increase in the labourer’s tenure percentile rank increases the probability of working 
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in January and February by 18.75 percentage points (p<0.001, 25 * 0.0075 = 0.1875). Longer-
standing labourers at the Cathedral were thus much more likely to be kept on when work slowed 
over the winter months. 
 
Table 6: Tenure and seasonal hiring patterns for active workers in the month of March 
 Prob. of Working 
in Jan and Feb - 
Coef 
Prob. of Working 




March - Coef 
Prob. of Rehiring 
in March - 
Margins 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Tenure - Cum. 
Days 
0.0467*** 0.0075*** 0.0341*** 0.0053*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0003) (0.0051) (0.0006) 
Constant -2.9451***  -1.2371*  
 (0.2546)  (0.4814)  
     
Year Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num. of 
observations 
1613 1613 565 565 
Num. of 
individuals 
533  282  
Pseudo R2 0.298  0.323  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in 
parentheses. Tenure given in cumulative days percentile. 
 
Columns (3) and (4) look exclusively at labourers who did not work in either January or February 
of a year. Were more tenured workers more likely to be rehired in March than less tenured 
workers? The dependent variable indicates whether an active labourer was hired in the month of 
March. The coefficient estimate in column (3) and marginal effect in column (4) suggest that 
more tenured laborers were more likely to be rehired in the spring. Among workers who were 
not hired in January or February, a one quartile increase in the labourer’s tenure percentile rank 
increases the probability of being hired in March by 13.25 percentage points (p<0.001, 25 * 
0.0053 = 0.1325). Long-standing labourers at the Cathedral thus had more stable employment, 
with an increased ability to return to work after seasonal downturns in hiring. The seasonality of 
building work strongly suggests that labourers were not absenting themselves for better offers on 
other sites. They were laid off in periods when low demand would be widespread across the 






4d.  Access to additional income earning opportunities 
Finally, how did the clerk distribute the chance to earn additional income from watch work? 
Watchman shifts could be a lucrative perk for labourers working at St. Paul’s, giving them an 
easy way to earn additional income. However, because shifts were constrained to eight or ten per 
month, watch work added at most a 15% supplement to a full-time worker’s income. Our test is 
the same as we employed in the previous sections: were long-standing labourers more likely to 
be given watchman’s shifts at St. Paul’s? 
 
Overall, just 8% of all labourers served as watchmen.20 Watch shifts were associated with longer 
tenure—the median tenure for workers who were given watch shifts was nine years, whereas the 
median tenure for workers who were not given watch shifts was only six months. Two-thirds of 
those put on watch had been involved as labourers for more than a year before their first watch 
shift. However, the majority of long-standing labourers still did not get any watch work—only 
32% of labourers who were employed for longer than two years in the construction period took 
watch shifts. In general, watch work seems to have been a valuable privilege that probably 
reflected information about trustworthiness.  
 
Table 7 suggests that watch shifts were an important way that labourers with longer tenure were 
rewarded at the Cathedral.  In the three models in Table 7, the dependent variable is whether or 
not a labourer was given a watch shift during an accounting period. Tenure is measured as 
before. The final years of the construction phase (1708-1711) are excluded because watchman 










20 The exception was the quiet years of the 1690s; in these slump years just under half of labourers took work as 
watchmen. In years when construction peaked, this fell to as low as 7% of labourers. 
26 
 
Table 7: Probability of a labourer having a watchman shift in an accounting period 



















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Tenure - 
Cum. Days 
0.0497*** 0.0053*** 0.0871***    
 (0.0054) (0.0006) (0.0145)    
Tenure - 
Elap. Time 
   0.0431*** 0.0048*** 0.0591** 
    (0.0055) (0.0007) (0.0194) 
Constant -5.6099***   -4.7720***   
 (0.5309)   (0.5134)   
Year Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Labourer 
Fixed Effects 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Num. of 
observations 
16903 16903 7388 16903 16903 7388 
Num. of 
individuals 
746   746   
Pseudo R2 0.228  0.214 0.188  0.168 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in 
parentheses. Tenure given in percentile. 
 
Columns (1) and (2) give the coefficients and marginal effects of our main logit model. The 
marginal effect of tenure rank, measured by cumulative days previously worked, is 0.0053 
(p<0.001). This means that a one quartile increase in the percentile rank of a labourer’s tenure 
increases the probability that a labourer is given a watchman shift by 13.25 percentage points 
(25*0.0053 = 0.1325). Figure 6 plots how the probability of being awarded a watchman shift 
changes with a labourer’s tenure percentile. New labourers in the 10th percentile in terms of 
tenure had only a 15.3% chance of being given a watchman shift, while those in the 90th 
percentile had a 41.2% chance. Column (3) gives the coefficients from a conditional logit with 
labourer fixed effects. This model needs to be interpreted cautiously, as over half of the 
observations are dropped. This is because the within-labourer effect of tenure on the probability 
of getting a watchman shift cannot be estimated for labourers who are never given a watchman 
shift over their career at the Cathedral. Keeping this in mind, the within-labourer effect of tenure 
on getting a watchman shift is very large and significant. Columns (4) and (5) give the estimates 
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and marginal effects where tenure rank is measuring in elapsed time. The effect is robust to this 
alternative measure of tenure and is of a similar magnitude.  Column (6) indicates that this 
relationship is robust to the inclusion of labourer fixed effects, with the same qualifications as 
the model in column (3).  
 
Figure 6. Probability of being awarded a watchman shift with a labourer’s tenure percentile.  
 
Source: See text 
 
4e. Implications for labourer income 
Long term labourers were advantaged at both the extensive and intensive margin. The impact of 
this on employment and income over the year was substantial. The median number of days 
worked per year for all labourers in any year just 145, but for those who were active at the 
Cathedral for more than two years, the median was 200 days.21 With longer tenure, labourers 
could achieve something like full-time work. Because wages were nominally rigid, this differential 
in hiring determined the level of income that labourers could achieve. Current standard estimates 
of annual income for this period are generally based on day rates of 20d to 24d earned for a 
standard 250 days a year (Allen 2009; Broadberry 2015). This implies an average labourer earned 
£20 -£25 per annum. At St. Paul’s, daily rates were lower and labourers were given widely 
varying amounts of work. 
 
21 Calculations for the construction phase, excluding watch shifts. 
28 
 
Table 8. Average annual income (£) for labouring and watch at St Paul’s, by tenure  
 Tenure Percentile 
 1st-24th 25th-49th 50th-74th 75th-99th 
Construction 
1675-9 £3.61 £7.73 £11.16 £10.31 
1680-4 £6.31 £9.79 £13.38 £13.53 
1685-9 £4.11 £9.63 £11.33 £14.84 
1690-4 £4.95 £11.32 £14.08 £17.98 
1695-9 £8.72 £15.47 £15.86 £20.56 
1700-4 £11.56 £16.21 £19.79 £22.85 
1705-9 £9.78 £16.42 £18.71 £22.34 
Maintenance 1711-1748  £15.75 £19.09 £18.57 £19.25 
 
Tenure based on the elapsed time since a labourer began working at St. Paul’s. Percentile rank is calculated each 
year relative to all labourers who worked in that year.  
 
The dispersion in labourers’ income is apparent in Table 8, which summarises the average 
income of labourers according to their tenure for each half decade of the construction period, 
1675-1709, and for the maintenance period, 1711-1748.  These calculations include pay for days 
worked as a labourer as well as any additional income from watch shifts. In each period, 
labourers who had worked at the Cathedral the longest had higher annual incomes than those 
who were relatively new to the project. Their access to more days of work, more consistent 
working patterns, and watchman shifts paid off in substantially higher average annual incomes 
than those in the bottom half of the tenure distribution.   
 
During the early years of construction, Table 8 indicates that even the most tenured workers 
earned less than £20 per year in nominal terms. These workers needed to find work on multiple 
sites or in a variety of by-employments each year if they were to earn enough to support 
themselves and a family, an achievement which the seasonality of construction work must have 
made difficult. However, with the stabilization in hiring at the Cathedral, labourers’ incomes 
grew markedly. By 1700-9, the majority of labourers were employed for enough days each year 
on this site to earn over £18. As work moved to maintenance after 1711, and the labouring 
workforce dwindled to a few men in each month, the average labourer at the Cathedral was 
employed for over 300 days a year, and even labourers in the lowest quartile of tenure were 
earning £16 or more. In real terms this would have fluctuated considerably, as this was a period 
of highly volatile price inflation and deflation.22 
 




To summarize, during the period of construction at St. Paul’s, employment was highly polarised, 
with longer-standing labourers at St. Paul’s receiving preferential treatment in four ways. First, 
they were rewarded with more days of work in each period in which they were present. Second, 
they were more likely to be retained. Third, they were more likely to be rehired after periods of 
low demand. Finally, they were given access to lucrative watchman shifts. As this system 




We have observed a split in the labour force at St. Paul’s, where a core set of workers achieved 
relative job stability and access to additional income opportunities, while a periphery of 
temporary workers experienced short tenure and lower incomes. The day wage rate was almost 
identical for all workers in both groups. There are two plausible explanations for these findings. 
 
First, these divergent experiences could simply reflect productivity differences between 
labourers. To the best of our knowledge, at St. Paul’s all of the general labourers recorded in the 
accounts were doing similar work requiring a similar skill level. In this context, the decision to 
reward longer-tenure building labourers with more days or watchman shifts suggests workers 
may have had differences in their innate productivity which the clerk was able to learn about, or 
that labourers at St. Paul’s gradually built up firm-specific human capital. In a competitive 
market, we would expect these differences among workers to be acknowledged in differences in 
the wage rate. As wages were rigid, offering extra work could have been a compensating 
differential for the relatively low wages the most productive workers received.  
 
A second explanation is that the early modern building market in London had more frictions 
than has been previously assumed. The extreme nominal wage rigidity we observed could be an 
efficiency wage strategy in order to address principal-agent problems (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), 
to minimize turnover costs (Stigliz, 1974), or to overcome information asymmetries with adverse 
selection (Weiss 1980). The efficacy of these strategies varies with workers’ tenure, possibly 
explaining the different experiences of tenured and non-tenured workers at the Cathedral. This 
explanation could also be consistent with a view of St Paul’s as a monopsonistic employer whose 
market power derives from both its size (as the largest site in the city) and a high variance and 




Our results are most obviously consistent with a model in which St. Paul’s faced high costs of 
hiring and training workers. To reduce the costs of turnover, some workers were given access to 
additional income. This ensured enough worker retention to minimize these costs and these 
workers then achieved higher levels of tenure. High turnover costs could also explain the 
additional benefits tenured workers received such as more consistent work and a higher 
probability of being rehired after seasonal breaks. If turnover costs were significant at St. Paul’s, 
there would be incentive to create long-term bonds such as implicit contracts that could provide 
this form of job security.  
 
The employment patterns we observe at St. Paul’s could reflect pure productivity differences 
between workers, a turnover-reduction strategy, or some combination of both. We must leave 
the identification of which was actually in play to future research. In either case, our results 
considerably revise our understanding of labour markets during this period. Labourers were 
likely non-homogenous in important ways, and their income varied according to the amount of 
days worked rather than their wage rate. The Cathedral optimized the structure of its pool of 
general labourers in order to retain the most productive workers and to reduce turnover costs. 
This early modern firm thus appears to be a lot more modern than has been previously assumed.  
 
Given the difference between our findings and earlier assumptions, the question arises of how 
much we can surmise about the market for and employment of unskilled labour more generally 
from St. Paul’s. The very existence of the records we study, and the argument we pursue, 
suggests employment patterns may have been different at this site because its scale and duration 
offered the opportunity for longer-term working relationships than other projects.   
 
The Cathedral certainly was unusually large and created unusually detailed records. However, it 
does not seem unrepresentative. We know that other aspects of building work on the Cathedral 
operated in the same way as on other large sites in the city (Stephenson 2020a: 35-64, 79-106). 
The wharving of the Fleet ditch in the early 1670s reputedly used hundreds of labourers 
contracted by Thomas Fitch, but the project only lasted two to three years, and no named 
records survive (Skempton 2002: 228). The numbers of labourers hired at Westminster Abbey, 
1712-13, and Greenwich, 1696-1706, which were two of the largest contemporaneous sites, 
indicate fewer than ten general (not trade specific) labourers on site at any one time.23 Similarly, 
Woodward  (1995:100-106) offers evidence of some labourers’ long term association with sites.  
 
23 Westminster Abbey Muniments cat. no.34513; The National Archives, Greenwich Hospital ADM 68/4, 
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There would have been other places such as the dockyards that operated similar systems of 
hiring as St. Paul’s, but it is impossible to test whether the same trends in tenure and hiring 
occurred. However, the records of the contractors who operated such sites indicate a positive 
relationship between tenure and the annual numbers of days worked (Stephenson 2020b, p. 424). 
Therefore, although St. Paul’s is unique, the operation of its hiring and contracting were broadly 




Workers on London’s largest building site in the later seventeenth-century faced high levels of 
uncertainty about whether or not they would be given work in the next week or month. The 
needs of the project varied dramatically, and with it the chance of hiring. However, work was not 
allocated in a pure spot market. Instead, the Cathedral prioritized a core of long-term workers, 
who were put at the head of the queue in hiring, offered additional work as watchmen, and 
allotted a larger share of the available work than their less-experienced peers, who received short 
and insecure periods of work. Tenure—as we might generously term what remained a tenuous 
and intermittent relationship—was rewarded by the Cathedral with access to larger amounts of 
work, and so a higher and more reliable income. Building labourers’ incomes were thus more 
varied than their wage rates per day imply. 
 
We argue that this is explicable if St. Paul’s was using its hiring strategy to deal with the 
heterogeneity of labourers attracted to the site. Wages did not adjust to shifts in demand for long 
periods, rather the nominal wage rates persisted for eight decades of urban expansion, persistent 
GDP growth, and structural change. Labourers were incentivized to return by the prospect of 
higher incomes not higher wages: more work, not more money per day. Our sources do not 
allow us to observe what it was about these particular labourers that the Cathedral preferred: 
they may have been more productive, disciplined, diligent or quiescent; all we can say is that they 
were treated preferentially because of it. St. Paul’s thus presents a phenomenon that is, in the 
context of the existing literature, unexpected for a pre-industrial labour market. The mechanism 
used to reward and retain workers may have been distinctive, but clearly the idea of organizing 
employment to secure a specific cohort of workers did not need to wait for large corporate firms 
or scientific management practices. Rather, they seem to emerge endogenously as a response to 
the standard challenge of supplying large numbers of workers of a suitable quality in a volatile 
labour market. While St. Paul’s is architecturally unique, it represents a broad category of major 
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institutional construction projects. This indicates that some of the characteristics of modern 
management practices could emerge organically in pre-industrial labour markets, even those that 
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García-Zúñiga, M., López-Losa, E. Building Workers in Madrid (1737-1805). New Wage Series 
and Working Lives EHES Working Paper, No. 152, May 2019 
Grantham, G., & MacKinnon, M. (1994). Labour market evolution: The economic history of market 
integration, wage flexibility and the employment relation. London: Routledge. 
Harris, R., (2020) Going the distance: Eurasian trade and the rise of the business corporation, 1400–1700 
Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press.  
Hobsbawm, E., (1968). Custom, wage and workload (1964) pp. in  Labouring men: Studies in the 
history of labour. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Hoppit, J. (1987). Risk and Failure in English Business 1700–1800, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Howlett, P. (2004). The Internal Labour Dynamics of the Great Eastern Railway Company, 
1870-1913. The Economic History Review, 57(2), 396-422. 
Huberman, A. (1996). Escape from the market: Negotiating work in Lancashire. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Humphries, J., & Weisdorf, J. (2019). Unreal Wages? Real Income and Economic Growth in 
England, 1260-1850. Economic Journal, 129(10), 2867-2887. 
Hatcher, J. (2011) Unreal Wages: Long-Run Living Standards and the ‘Golden Age’ of the 
Fifteenth Century in Hatcher, J., and Stephenson J.Z. eds.(2019) Seven Centuries of Unreal 
Wages: The Unreliable Data, Sources and Methods that have been used for Measuring Standards of 
Living in the Past.  London: Palgrave.  
Hatcher, J.  (1998) Labour, leisure and economic thought before the nineteenth century, Past & 
Present, Volume 160, Issue 1, August 1998, 64–115, https://doi.org/10.1093/past/160.1.64 
Kelly, M., Mokyr, J., & Gráda, C. Ó. (2014). Precocious Albion: A new interpretation of the 
British Industrial revolution. Annual Review of Economics, 6, 363-389.  
Landes, D. S. (1986). What Do Bosses Really Do? The Journal of Economic History, 46(3), 585-623. 
Landers, J. (1987). Mortality and Metropolis: the Case of London 1675-1825. Population Studies 
41/1, 59-76.  
Machin, S., &  Manning, A., (2004). A Test of Competitive Labor Market Theory: The Wage 
Structure among Care Assistants in the South of England. Industrial & Labor Relations 
Review, 57(3), 371-385.  
Manley, G. (1974). Central England Temperatures: Monthly Means 1659 to 1973, Quarterly 
Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society, 389-405 
Manning, A. (2003). Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets Princeton.  
Manning A, Chapter 11, Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market, David Card, Orley 
Ashenfelter, Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 4B,2011; 973-1041, Elsevier,  
Murphy, A. L. (2010). Learning the business of banking: The management of the Bank of 
England's first tellers. Business History, 52(1), 150-168. 
35 
 
Murphy, A. L. (2015). ‘Writes a fair hand and appears to be well qualified’: The recruitment of 
Bank of England clerks, 1800–1815. Financial History Review, 22(1), 19-44. 
Naidu, S. & Yuchtman, N. (2013). Coercive Contract Enforcement: Law and the Labor Market 
in Nineteenth Century Industrial Britain. The American Economic Review, 103(1), 107-144. 
Naidu, S., Manning, A., and Dube, A. (2018) Monopsony and Employer Mis-optimization 
Explain Why Wages Bunch at Round Numbers. NBER  
Rogers, J. (1886). Six centuries of Work and Wages: The history of English labour. London: W.S. 
Sonnenschein. 
Polyani, K, (1957), The Great Transformation, Beacon, Boston. 
Pollard, S. (1965). The genesis of modern management: A study of the industrial revolution in Great Britain. 
London: Edward Arnold. 
Pollard S., (1978) Labour in Britain, Chap 3 in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe, 
Vol VII,  edited by P Mathias and MM. Postan, Cambridge.  
Rule, J. (1981). The experience of Labour in eighteenth-century industry, London: Croom Helm. 
Scholliers, P, and Schwarz, L. D. (2003). Experiencing Wages: Social and Cultural Aspects of Wage 
Forms in Europe since 1500. New York ; Oxford: Berghahn. 
Schwarz, L. D. (1992). London in the Age of Industrialisation. Cambridge University Press. 
Schwarz, L., (2007). Custom Wage and Workload, Past and Present.  
Seltzer, Andrew, and Sammartino, André. (2009), Internal labour markets: evidence from two 
large Australian employers. Australian Economic History Review 49.2 107-37. 
Shapiro, C., & Stiglitz, J. (1984). Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device. The 
American Economic Review, 74(3), 433-444. 
Skempton, A. W, & Chrimes, M. (2002). A biographical dictionary of civil engineers in Great 
Britain and Ireland. London: Thomas Telford. 
Staiger, Douglas O, Joanne Spetz, and Ciaran S Phibbs. 2010. Is there monopsony in the labor 
market? Evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Labor Economics, 28(2): 211–236. 
Stephenson, J.Z.  (2018). ‘Real’ wages? Contractors, workers, and pay in London building trades, 
1650–1800. Economic History Review, 71(1), 106-132. 
Stephenson, J. Z.  (2020a) Contracts and Pay: Work in London Construction 1650 -1785, London: 
Palgrave. 
Stephenson, J. Z. (2020b) Working Days in a London Construction Team in the Eighteenth 
Century: Evidence from St Paul's Cathedral. The Economic History Review 73.2 (2020a): 409-
30. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1974). Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in LDC's: 
The Labor Turnover Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88(2), 194-227. 
Szostak, Rick. (1989):  The Organization of Work: The Emergence of the Factory Revisited. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 11.3 343-58. 
Thompson, E. (1963). The making of the English working class. London: Gollancz.  
Thomas, R and Dimsdale, N (2017) "A Millennium of UK Data", Bank of England OBRA 
dataset, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/threecenturies.aspx 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020), Job Openings and Labor Turnover, Monthly economic 
news release, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/jolts.pdf 
Wallis, P.H. (2014), Labour markets and Training in Cambridge Economic History of Modern 
Britain, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Weiss, A. (1980). Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 88(3), 526-538. 
Wilson, A., & Thomson, W. J. (2006). The making of modern management British management 
in historical perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, J. G. (1987). Did English Factor Markets Fail during the Industrial Revolution? 
Oxford Economic Papers, 39(4), 641-678. 
36 
 
Winch, G. (1986). The labour process and labour market in construction. International Journal of 
Sociology and Social Policy, 6(2), 103-116.  
Woodward, D. (1995). Men at Work: Labourers and Building Craftsmen in the Towns of Northern 
England, 1450–1750 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Wrigley, E. A. (1967). A simple model of London's importance in changing English society and 
economy 1650–1750. Past & Present, 37(1), 44-70. 
Van Zanden, J. L. (1999). Wages and the standard of living in Europe, 1500–1800. European 
Review of Economic History, 3(2), 175-197. 
Van Zanden, J. (2009). The skill premium and the ‘Great Divergence’. European Review of Economic 





Appendix A: Worker Churn at St. Pauls 
This appendix explains our approach to churn at St Paul’s Cathedral. Worker churn has three 
main components. Firms add or cut jobs, as demand increases or falls. Firms fire some workers 
while other workers quit, and replacements are hired. And firms are established or fail. Measures 
of turnover depends on how many of these channels of hiring and separation are observed, and 
the basis for measuring worker churn varies in important ways between studies.  
 
Measures of turnover also depend on how employment is captured. Where employment is 
measured via a quasi-census at intervals, some types of churn are omitted. For example, present 
day measures for Germany and other settings utilize data that capture employment at sequential 
cross sections: Bachmann et al (2020) consider a labourer to be working for an establishment if 
she is employed at the end of the quarter. The number of jobs at the end of the quarter follows 
from this (Jit); the number of hires (Hit) is the number of workers who were not working at the 
end of the previous quarter; and the number of separations (Sit) is the number who had been 
working at the end of the previous quarter and who have now left (Bachman et al:5, 25-28). 
Turnover within a quarter is not observable in this approach. Alternatively, some sources, such as 
the LEHD dataset studied by Davis et al (2006), include all worker transitions of whatever 
duration. Measures of this kind produce much higher rates of hiring and separation than those 
that focus on ‘full quarters’ (Davis et al 2006:6). 
 
Our dataset is organized into periods of one or more month’s duration and reports all workers 
employed in an accounting period (month, quarter or longer) as labourers and watchmen, 
including short employment spells. We construct measures of job and worker flow within St 
Paul’s based on the available accounting periods. Where the duration of the accounts is a month, 
we define the number of jobs, Jit, as the number of workers employed as day labourers within 
that month (excluding workers employed solely as watchmen). The number of labourers who 
appear in the records in that month but not in the previous month gives us our count of hires, 
Hit. The number of labourers who were not retained from the previous month is our count of 
separations, Sit. We compute net monthly job flow as JFit = Jit – Jit-1. Job creation JCit occurs 
where employment increases (JFit>0) and job destruction JDit occurs when it falls (JFit<0). 
Because more workers may be hired or separated in a period than jobs (i.e. Hit>JCit>0), we also 




We follow the normal convention (Davis et al 1996) in converting hiring and separation flows 
into rates by dividing totals by the average of employment in the previous and current period, so 




Other rates (separation, job creation, job destruction and churn) are defined in the same manner. 
This approach constrains growth rates to between -200 and +200 percent. We report rates based 
on monthly accounts which survive for much of the construction phase. These calculations are 
restricted to periods for which two sequential accounts are of one-month duration. For quarterly 
estimates, the period commonly found in the modern literature, we carry out the same 
calculation using three-month windows and taking the first quarter as January to March, to align 
with general practice.  
 
The measures we report are the equivalent to ‘all transition’ figures, because they count every 
person employed, no matter how long they stayed. Workers who were only hired for a few days 
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on one occasion still count as a hire and a separation, even though they just appeared in a single 
month or quarter, respectively. Workers who had been employed previously, but had been 
absent for a period, are also counted as new hires. 
 
For comparison, we also compute ‘full quarter’ figures. We report two variants on the quarterly 
data. First, in our ‘quarterly (any)’ calculations we treat workers as employed if they are hired at 
any point within a quarter. From this definition, follows the number of jobs at the cathedral, the 
number of hires (workers who had not been active in the previous quarter), and separations 
(workers who were no longer active from the previous quarter). These figures have the 
advantage of observing all transitions of any period.  
 
Second, in our ‘quarterly, (quasi-census)’ calculations we treat workers as employed if they are 
employed in the final month of a quarter (March, June, September, December). This is the 
closest we can come to the approach taken by Bachmann et al (2020) who define employment 
based on a worker being employed at the end of a quarter. These figures neglect short-term 
employment in other months and are oriented towards identifying longer-term hiring. These 
figures are useful for comparison, but should be treated with caution, given that short periods of 
work were the norm and they will be particularly shaped by the specifics of hiring in the final 
month of each the quarter.  
 
The number of months falling into observation in the monthly series is reported in the main 
text. The number of quarters in observation is given in Table A.1. To estimate churn, we require 
a quarter to be part of a continuous sequence of accounts, ensuring we observe the previous and 
the next quarter in order to work out hiring and separations.  
 
Table A.1: Quarters in observation for churn estimates by quinquennia. 
Period Quarters observed (n) Share of quarters observed (%) 
   
1675- 17 85 
1680- 11 55 
1685- 15 75 
1690- 20 100 
1695- 7 35 
1700- 14 70 
1705- 20 100 
   
Total 97 69 
 
Our data allow us to distinguish permanent from temporary separation and hiring. Permanent 
hiring and separation are defined as occurring on a workers’ first and last appearance in the 
Cathedral records. Because temporary absences where workers appear in one period and then 
return to work after a period of absence are common in the St Pauls records, the permanent 
hiring and separation rates are substantially below the job creation and job destruction rate. 
 
Where the numbers employed increased, this is job creation. Where the numbers decrease this is 
job destruction. When there is no creation/destruction, the figure is set to zero. The closest 
modern equivalent would be the flow of workers into and out of zero-hours contracts with 
highly unstable monthly labour demand. Aggregate rates in the literature are calculated using 
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seasonally adjusted series. We do not adjust for seasonality, given that we are dealing with a 
single site with highly volatile employment.  
 
Table A.2: Churn Estimates, Monthly  
Job Creation Rate (monthly) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 7.78 12.21 0 51.43 50 
1680- 6.86 14.14 0 70.97 33 
1685- 7.50 12.55 0 54.21 43 
1690- 5.53 6.38 0 34.78 50 
1695- 3.03 4.49 0 13.33 17 
1700- 5.46 9.90 0 43.90 42 
1705- 7.24 21.75 0 120.61 60 
Total 6.54 13.68 0 120.61 295 
 
Job Destruction Rate (monthly) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 10.28 15.35 0 48.78 50 
1680- 8.91 13.28 0 49.06 33 
1685- 8.45 14.16 0 54.95 43 
1690- 2.89 7.28 0 38.60 50 
1695- 5.08 9.35 0 28.57 17 
1700- 2.74 9.83 0 60.00 42 
1705- 5.88 21.60 0 134.18 60 
Total 6.34 14.69 0 134.18 295 
 
Hiring Rate, first starts (monthly) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 4.96 6.52 0 30.86 50 
1680- 1.40 3.68 0 16.13 33 
1685- 8.69 12.26 0 54.21 43 
1690- 4.30 4.30 0 15.73 50 
1695- 1.49 2.33 0 6.90 17 
1700- 3.89 6.47 0 27.59 42 
1705- 3.45 5.37 0 35.90 60 










Hiring Rate, starts & returns (monthly) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 14.23 13.42 0 51.43 50 
1680- 10.06 14.68 0 74.19 33 
1685- 11.67 13.42 0 57.94 43 
1690- 8.57 7.38 0 34.78 50 
1695- 4.09 4.49 0 13.33 17 
1700- 7.30 11.01 0 43.90 42 
1705- 9.42 21.46 0 120.61 60 
Total 9.88 14.34 0 120.61 295 
 
Separation Rate, final (monthly) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 7.66 8.01 0 32.89 50 
1680- 3.73 5.52 0 23.53 33 
1685- 8.23 8.53 0 35.56 43 
1690- 3.67 5.27 0 22.86 50 
1695- 4.83 7.39 0 22.64 17 
1700- 1.97 3.71 0 20.00 42 
1705- 2.26 4.94 0 35.44 60 
Total 4.56 6.68 0 35.56 295 
 
Separation Rate, temporary & final (monthly) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 16.77 14.75 0 48.78 50 
1680- 12.11 13.18 0 52.83 33 
1685- 12.75 13.75 0 54.95 43 
1690- 5.93 7.77 0 38.60 50 
1695- 6.14 9.72 0 28.57 17 
1700- 4.58 10.44 0 60.00 42 
1705- 8.06 21.61 0 134.18 60 





Table A.3: Churn Estimates, Quarterly, Any 
Note: these figures report rates based on any appearance by a worker in each quarter. 
 
Creation Rate (quarterly, any) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 5.97 9.36 0 27.45 16 
1680- 5.01 8.90 0 33.33 20 
1685- 14.53 26.45 0 90.00 20 
1690- 10.35 11.56 0 41.67 20 
1695- 9.64 14.41 0 51.43 20 
1700- 15.92 24.71 0 88.37 20 
1705- 7.80 9.03 0 30.05 20 
Total 10.00 16.72 0 90.00 136 
 
Job Destruction Rate (quarterly, any) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 13.49 12.47 0 31.93 16 
1680- 8.86 10.23 0 26.09 20 
1685- 13.06 17.50 0 71.60 20 
1690- 7.78 15.82 0 52.38 20 
1695- 10.37 19.85 0 73.17 20 
1700- 13.74 29.89 0 100.00 20 
1705- 3.87 9.21 0 30.93 20 
Total 10.07 17.75 0 100.00 136 
 
Hiring Rate, first starts (quarterly, any) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 11.23 12.81 0 49.11 16 
1680- 4.63 5.98 0 21.28 20 
1685- 18.86 25.20 0 86.67 20 
1690- 11.29 8.31 0 28.26 20 
1695- 7.34 8.40 0 34.57 20 
1700- 8.57 11.01 0 32.32 20 
1705- 9.15 8.05 0 27.12 20 














Hiring Rate, starts & returns (quarterly, any) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 17.70 14.94 0 51.25 16 
1680- 11.41 11.02 0 34.62 20 
1685- 23.19 26.91 0 91.67 20 
1690- 17.07 12.08 0 45.83 20 
1695- 14.04 15.15 0 57.14 20 
1700- 18.42 25.30 0 88.37 20 
1705- 12.18 9.89 2 33.16 20 
Total 16.25 17.76 0 91.67 136 
 
Separation Rate, final (quarterly, any) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 18.62 11.15 0 37.45 16 
1680- 9.23 6.58 0 23.08 20 
1685- 16.50 14.18 0 49.38 20 
1690- 10.96 10.94 0 38.10 20 
1695- 8.79 8.76 0 28.99 20 
1700- 6.02 8.25 0 25.53 20 
1705- 5.58 6.49 0 27.16 20 
Total 10.59 10.57 0 49.38 136 
 
Separation Rate, temporary & final (quarterly, any) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 25.22 12.81 2 42.70 16 
1680- 15.27 9.70 0 34.78 20 
1685- 21.73 18.41 2 74.07 20 
1690- 14.51 15.54 0 61.90 20 
1695- 14.77 19.33 0 73.17 20 
1700- 16.23 29.38 0 100.00 20 
1705- 8.26 10.63 0 37.11 20 





Table A.4: Churn Estimates, Quarterly, Quasi-Census 
Note: these figures report rates based on any appearance by a worker in the final monthly account of a quarter, 
replicating the ‘end of quarter’ approach. 
 
Job Creation Rate (quarterly, quasi-census) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 11.73 19.48 0 72.82 16 
1680- 5.59 10.38 0 24.00 8 
1685- 17.93 30.03 0 85.71 14 
1690- 10.35 12.41 0 46.81 20 
1695- 11.28 18.06 0 41.03 6 
1700- 10.46 18.68 0 63.83 13 
1705- 8.29 10.72 0 32.50 20 
Total 10.93 17.73 0 85.71 97 
 
Job Destruction Rate (quarterly, quasi-census) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 15.65 20.93 0 59.83 16 
1680- 11.66 13.60 0 30.77 8 
1685- 19.99 26.33 0 75.47 14 
1690- 7.37 11.30 0 40.00 20 
1695- 16.74 22.49 0 47.06 6 
1700- 5.43 18.43 0 66.67 13 
1705- 4.29 8.34 0 23.20 20 
Total 10.59 17.81 0 75.47 97 
 
Hiring Rate, first starts (quarterly, quasi-census) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 4.81 8.28 0 32.82 16 
1680- 0.42 1.20 0 3.39 8 
1685- 7.84 10.52 0 30.36 14 
1690- 3.32 4.01 0 15.91 20 
1695- 1.98 1.55 0 3.33 6 
1700- 3.71 7.95 0 27.59 13 
1705- 2.66 2.33 0 8.62 20 










Hiring Rate, starts & returns (quarterly, quasi-census) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 17.60 12.54 0 42.67 16 
1680- 10.70 8.80 0 24.00 8 
1685- 14.68 17.42 0 56.00 14 
1690- 10.44 10.36 0 38.30 20 
1695- 7.25 9.83 0 26.67 6 
1700- 6.93 12.26 0 38.30 13 
1705- 7.24 6.23 0 25.53 20 
Total 10.93 11.81 0 56.00 97 
 
Separation Rate, final (quarterly, quasi-census) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 6.68 8.91 0 34.91 16 
1680- 6.94 6.16 0 16.33 8 
1685- 8.13 8.24 0 26.59 14 
1690- 4.63 6.07 0 21.54 20 
1695- 8.90 10.78 0 26.47 6 
1700- 2.75 5.66 0 20.51 13 
1705- 3.61 5.33 0 23.63 20 
Total 5.47 7.17 0 34.91 97 
 
Separation Rate, temporary & final(quarterly, quasi-census) 
 mean sd min max count 
1675- 29.93 18.84 6 67.92 16 
1680- 19.58 13.34 7 40.68 8 
1685- 29.97 24.41 2 79.25 14 
1690- 15.57 13.90 0 52.31 20 
1695- 20.09 23.21 0 50.00 6 
1700- 10.68 17.37 0 66.67 13 
1705- 9.87 9.33 1 29.83 20 







Appendix B: Robustness Checks and Alternative Specifications  
This appendix considers whether the results for the intensity of work are robust to changes in 
how “full-time” is defined, to the use of a fractional logit model, to the inclusion of external 
shocks that may have affected hiring at St. Paul’s, and to the exclusion of possible foremen.  
 
B1. Are our main results robust to changes in the “full-time” boundary? 
The 85% of max days worked in a period boundary includes 7,189 of 19,861 (36.18%) 
observations for the construction period excluding the first few years and those working their 
first shift. Table B.1 shows that lowering or raising the boundary causes the percent of 
observations considered full-time to increase or decrease. At an 80% boundary, over half of 
observations are included as full-time workers. At a 95% boundary, less than one quarter of 
observations are included as full-time. 
 
Table B.1: Percent of workers full-time and not full-time at different boundaries 
 
 % Full-time % Not full-time 
Full-time > 75 57.99 42.01 
Full-time > 80 50.86 49.14 
Full-time > 85 36.18 63.82 
Full-time > 90 26.03 73.97 
Full-time > 95 18.40 81.60 
 
 
Figure B.1 gives the density of observations across 5-year buckets of the percent of maximum 
days worked by any labourer in the period. Over half of observations are past 80% of maximum 
days worked. The 85% boundary excludes the clusters of observations around 80% to capture 
the top end of the distribution in terms of days worked. Figure B.2 gives this histogram by 
decade. The 80% breakpoint is noticeable in each decade, especially after 1700.  
 
Figure B.1: 5-year bucket density observations with percentage of maximum days worked by any 






Figure B.2 5-year bucket density observations with percentage of maximum days worked by any 





Table B.2 gives the coefficients and marginal effects from a logit model for the probability of a 
labourer working full-time during an accounting period. The independent variable of interest is 
tenure in terms of the percentile rank of cumulative days worked previously. Columns (1) and (2) 
are the results where a worker is considered full-time at more than 80% of the maximum days 
worked during the accounting period. (3) and (4) give the results for the assumed full-time 
boundary of 85%. (5) and (6) use a full-time boundary of over 90%, and (7) and (8) use a full-
time boundary of over 95%. 
 
Table B.3 is structured the same way, capturing tenure through the percentile rank of elapsed 
time since the worker began at the cathedral. 
 
Both Table B.2 and Table B.3 indicate that the relationship of tenure to the intensity of work 
during an accounting period is robust to changing the boundary for when a worker is considered 
full-time. In all models in Table B.2, the marginal effects indicate that a one quartile increase in a 
labourer’s percentile rank of tenure in terms of cumulative days corresponds to over a 10 
percentage point increase in the probability that the labourer worked full-time during an 
accounting period, even as the boundary for full-time is adjusted (p < 0.001, 25 * 0.0040 = 0.10). 
Likewise, the models in Table B.3 indicate that a one quartile increase in a labourer’s percentile 
rank of tenure in terms of elapsed time corresponds to over a 7.5 percentage point increase in 
the probability that the labourer worked full-time during an accounting period, even as the 






Table B.2: Probability of a labourer working full-time at different full-time boundaries 
 
 FT 80 - 
Coef 
FT 80 - 
Margins 
FT 85 - 
Coef 
FT 85 - 
Margins 
FT 90 - 
Coef 
FT 90 - 
Margins 
FT 95 - 
Coef 
FT 95 - 
Margins 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Tenure - 
Cum. Days 
0.0235*** 0.0047*** 0.0267*** 0.0049*** 0.0295*** 0.0045*** 0.0329*** 0.0040*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0027) (0.0004) (0.0030) (0.0005) 
Constant -3.5724***  -3.7217***  -6.6361***  -7.4575***  
 (0.2160)  (0.2213)  (0.5982)  (0.9737)  
Year Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num. of 
observations 
19861 19861 19861 19861 19861 19861 19861 19861 
Num. of 
individuals 
798  798  798  798  
Pseudo R2 0.163  0.172  0.189  0.184  
 
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in parentheses. Tenure given in 
percentile. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table B.3: Probability of a labourer working full-time at different full-time boundaries 
 
 FT 80 - 
Coef 
FT 80 - 
Margins 
FT 85 - 
Coef 
FT 85 - 
Margins 
FT 90 - 
Coef 
FT 90 - 
Margins 
FT 95 - 
Coef 
FT 95 - 
Margins 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Tenure - 
Elap. Time 
0.0148*** 0.0031*** 0.0180*** 0.0035*** 0.0205*** 0.0033*** 0.0235*** 0.0030*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0005) (0.0026) (0.0005) (0.0030) (0.0005) (0.0033) (0.0005) 
Constant -2.7713***  -2.8929***  -5.7406***  -6.5117***  
 (0.2051)  (0.2206)  (0.6447)  (1.0644)  
Year Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num. of 
observations 
19861 19861 19861 19861 19861 19861 19861 19861 
Num. of 
individuals 
798  798  798  798  
Pseudo R2 0.126  0.131  0.146  0.139  
 
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in parentheses. Tenure given in 
percentile. 







B.2: Are our main results robust to a non-binary dependent variable? 
We can also check the robustness of our results by using a fractional dependent variable for the 
raw percentage of maximum days worked in a period. The model specification is a fractional 
logit model with year and month fixed effects. These results are given in Table B.4. 
 
Columns (1) and (2) use the percentile rank of cumulative days previously worked as the measure 
of tenure. The marginal effect indicates that a one quartile increase in percentile rank of tenure 
corresponds to a 10.75 percentage point increase in the percent of maximum days worked in an 
accounting period (p<0.001, 25*0.0043 = 10.75). Columns (3) and (4), using elapsed time 
percentile rank as the measure of tenure, indicate that a one quartile increase in percentile rank of 
tenure corresponds to a 7.8 percentage point increase in the percent of maximum days worked in 
an accounting period (p<0.001, 25*0.0031 = 7.8). Figure B.3 graphs the marginal effects for the 
model in (1) and (2). As the percentile rank increases, the percent of maximum days worked 
increases. 
 
Table B.4: Percent of maximum days worked in the accounting period 
 
 Cum. Days 
Frac. Logit - 
Coef 
Cum. Days 
Frac. Logit - 
Margins 
Elap. Time 
Frac. Logit - 
Coef 
Elap. Time 
Frac. Logit - 
Margins 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Tenure - Cum. Days 0.0215*** 0.0043***   
 (0.0017) (0.0003)   
Tenure - Elap. Time   0.0150*** 0.0031*** 
   (0.0019) (0.0004) 
Constant -2.5237***  -1.9146***  
 (0.1677)  (0.1575)  
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num. of observations 19861 19861 19861 19861 
Num. of individuals 798  798  
Pseudo R2 0.107  0.078  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in 



















Figure B.3: Marginal effects for the model (1) and (2) in Table B.4, showing percentile rank and 





B.3: Are our main results robust to the inclusion of external shocks which may have affected St. 
Paul’s? 
Over the period of the reconstruction of St. Paul’s, there were numerous external shocks which 
could have shaped the tightness of the construction labour force. In this Appendix, we briefly 
examine whether some of the major shocks of the period affect our main results on the 
relationship of tenure to the amount of days worked in each accounting period. We control for 
four types of historical shocks in our analysis in this Appendix: temperature, wars, mortality, and 
financial volatility (after 1688).  
 
Because construction is an extremely seasonal industry, variations in the weather patterns across 
years could affect the intensity of work in a given month. We control for these variations by 
including the mean monthly temperature of Central England in our analysis. This monthly time 
series is taken from Manley (1974).24 
 
Wars are disruptive to general economic activity and can draw young male labourers out of the 
workforce. As this population might overlap the labourers we observe at St. Paul’s, we include a 
dummy variable in our analysis indicating whether England was engaged in a war during each 
accounting period. This variable is based on Peter Brecke’s Conflict Catalogue, which gives the 
start and end dates of international conflicts during this period.25  
 
We also include a measure of general mortality in London to capture the effects of pestilence 
and disease on the labour force. The data we use is the number of burials each month in 
 
24 Manley, G. 1974. “Central England Temperatures: Monthly Means 1659 to 1973,” Quarterly Journal of the Royal 
Meteorological Society, pp. 389-405 
25 Brecke, Peter. 2012. Dataset: Conflict Catalogue (Violent Conflicts 1400 A.D. to the Present in Different Regions 
of the World). Available at http://www.cgeh.nl/data.  
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London. These data were kindly shared with us by John Landers, who developed the monthly 
series based on the London Bills of Mortality from 1675-1825.26 
 
Finally, we include a measure of the number of bankruptcies in London throughout the period 
as a proxy for general financial volatility. The Cathedral was a large project that relied heavily on 
borrowing, and thus employment and hiring at the Cathedral could have been shaped by the 
state of financial markets. Our annual series of bankruptcies in London is from Julian Hoppitt’s 
1987 study of English business, used for the eighteenth century by Schwarz (1992) .27  
 
The results of our robustness checks incorporating these additional variables are given in Table 1 
and Table 2. Our time series on bankruptcies in London begins only in 1688, so we first present 
the models without this variable for the entire construction period, and then including this 
variable but only for the period after 1688.  
 
Table B.5 indicates that our main results are robust to the inclusion of these additional controls. 
The marginal effects in column (2) imply that a one quartile increase in the percentile rank of a 
labourer’s tenure in terms of cumulative days worked increases their probability of working full-
time by 12.25 percentage points (p < 0.001, 25 * 0.0049 = 0.1225). This is identical to the main 
results in the paper. Likewise, the marginal effect for tenure in terms of elapsed time, given in 
column (5), is also identical. However, the within-labourer effects are not significant with either 
of these measures of tenure. All of the additional controls we include have the sign that is 
expected, with work intensity increasing with higher average temperatures, decreasing with wars, 
and decreasing, though not significantly, with mortality.  
  
 
26 Landers, John. 1987. “Mortality and Metropolis: the Case of London 1675-1825.” Population Studies 41/1, pp. 59-
76.  
27 Hoppit 1987, p.45; Schwarz 1992, p. 90-91 n.24.  
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Table B.5: Probability of a labourer working fulltime with controls for historical shocks 
 








(FE) - Coef 
Elap. Time 






(FE) - Coef 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tenure - Cum. Days 0.0269*** 0.0049*** 0.0109    
 (0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0059)    
Tenure - Elap. Time    0.0181*** 0.0035*** 0.0085 
    (0.0026) (0.0005) (0.0069) 
Monthly Burials -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003* 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Monthly Avg. Temp 0.0827*** 0.0150*** 0.1069*** 0.0791*** 0.0152*** 0.1067*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0025) (0.0174) (0.0134) (0.0025) (0.0174) 
Conflict Indicator -0.9211*** -0.1671*** -1.2571*** -0.8857*** -0.1702*** -1.2625*** 
 (0.1162) (0.0209) (0.1416) (0.1106) (0.0209) (0.1409) 
Constant -2.8397***   -2.0094***   
 (0.2884)   (0.2778)   
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Labourer Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Num. of observations 19861 19861 18921 19861 19861 18921 
Num. of individuals 798   798   
Pseudo R2 0.175  0.163 0.135  0.162 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in 
parentheses. Tenure given in percentile. 
 
 
Table B.6 incorporates the London bankruptcy data into the analysis, which restricts the years of 
the analysis to 1688-1710. Our results are robust to the inclusion of this variable. The marginal 
effect of tenure in terms of cumulative days worked increases from 0.0049 to 0.0051 (p<0.001), 
and the marginal effect in terms of elapsed time also increases from 0.0035 to 0.0041 (p<0.001). 
As in Table B.5, the within-labourer effects are not significant. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect 




Table B.6: Probability of a labourer working fulltime with controls for historical shocks and 
bankruptcies, 1688-1710 
 
 Cum. Days 






(FE) - Coef 
Elap. Time 






(FE) - Coef 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tenure - Cum. Days 0.0289*** 0.0051*** 0.0042    
 (0.0030) (0.0005) (0.0080)    
Tenure - Elap. Time    0.0223*** 0.0041*** 0.0085 
    (0.0031) (0.0006) (0.0069) 
Monthly Burials -0.0003* -0.0001* -0.0005** -0.0003* -0.0001* -0.0003* 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Monthly Avg. Temp 0.0042 0.0007 0.0130 0.0036 0.0007 0.1067*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0026) (0.0200) (0.0139) (0.0026) (0.0174) 
Conflict Indicator -0.7379*** -0.1304*** -1.1376*** -0.7243*** -0.1338*** -1.2625*** 
 (0.1436) (0.0251) (0.1833) (0.1361) (0.0248) (0.1409) 
Annual Bankruptcies 0.0147*** 0.0026*** 0.0167 0.0136*** 0.0025**  
 (0.0041) (0.0008) (0.0099) (0.0041) (0.0008)  
Constant -2.0320***   -1.5860***   
 (0.3284)   (0.3189)   
Year Fixed Effects  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Month Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Labourer Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Year 
Num. of observations 13401 13401 12733 13401 13401 18921 
Num. of individuals 473   473   
Pseudo R2 0.198  0.168 0.167  0.162 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in 
parentheses. Tenure given in percentile. 
 
 
B.4: Are our main results robust to the exclusion of labourers that might have been foremen? 
During the period of construction, fewer than ten men were paid more than the standard day 
rates of 16d and 18d. Historical records suggest that these men were foremen, acting in a 
managerial role.28 As foremen, they would have worked most days in an accounting period and 
had significant tenure. It is thus possible that they impacted the relationship we find between 
tenure and intensity of work. 
 
To check whether this is the case, as a robustness check we run the main models excluding any 
labourer who earned over 18 pence per day during their time working for St. Paul’s. This results 
in dropping 548 observations representing the work of 7 out of 797 labourers. The results are 





28 See Campbell (2007) pp.42-44.  
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Table B.7 Probability of a labourer working fulltime, with foremen excluded from sample 
 

















(FE) - Coef 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Tenure - Cum. Days 0.0256*** 0.0046*** 0.0114    
 (0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0059)    
Tenure - Elap. Time    0.0179*** 0.0034*** 0.0093 
    (0.0027) (0.0005) (0.0068) 
Constant -3.7124***   -2.9761***   
 (0.2295)   (0.2220)   
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Labourer Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Num. of observations 19313 19313 18447 19313 19313 18447 
Num. of individuals 790   790   
Pseudo R2 0.173  0.155 0.140  0.154 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in 







Appendix C: Change Over Time 
The results presented in Table 3 in the main text indicate that long-standing labourers were given 
more days of work in each accounting period than labourers with less tenure. How did the 
relationship between tenure and days worked change over time? 
 
First, St. Paul’s was built in stages (Campbell, 2007:102-3). From the late 1660s demolition work 
was carried out and this was not finally completed until the late 1680s even as the lower walls of 
the new cathedral were raised, and the masonry walls of the choir were up by 1690. Roofing was 
carried out throughout the first decade of the new century. One stage of building which 
challenged the skills of all on site was the construction of the dome from 1705 through 
completion in 1711.  This building phase was experimental and required bricklayers, carpenters 
and plasterers to work alongside masons with innovations in scaffoldings and materials 
(Campbell 2007:121-137) which may have required more experience than other general labouring 
jobs. Without raising wage rates, it is possible that St. Paul’s awarded more working days per 
month, and more consistent working days, to secure experienced labourers to complete the 
construction of the dome.  
 
Table C.1 presents three models exploring whether the relationship between tenure and days 
worked in a month changed during the period of dome construction at the cathedral. The 
dependent variable is the probability of working full-time during the accounting period, defined 
as in Table 3 in the main text. Prior tenure is measured by cumulative days worked in previous 
accounting periods in columns (1) and (2), and by elapsed time since the labourer began working 
at St. Paul’s in columns (3) and (4). All models have year and month fixed effects with clustered 
standard errors. 
 
Column (1), our primary results, give the coefficients and marginal effects of a logit model using 
the cumulative days measure of tenure. The significant interaction term indicates that the 
relationship between tenure and whether labourers worked fulltime did change during the period 
of dome construction. The marginal effects, given in the third panel of Table 3, imply that a one 
quartile increase in a labourer’s tenure percentile rank increases the probability of working full-
time by 8.5 percentage points in the period prior to dome construction (p < 0.05, 25*0.0034 = 
0.085), and by 13.5 percentage points during the period of dome construction (p < 0.05, 
25*0.0054 = 0.135).  Figure C.1 shows that in both periods, labourers with more tenure were 





Table C.1: Probability of a labourer working full-time, dome building vs. rest of building 
 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
     
Tenure - Cum. Days 0.0232*** 0.0094   
 (0.0027) (0.0060)   
Dome = 1 1.3000* -0.1795 0.8801* -0.0696 
 (0.4087) (0.9003) (0.4287) (1.0492) 
Dome * Tenure - Cum. Days 0.0128* 0.0313**   
 (0.0057) (0.0083)   
Tenure - Elap. Time   0.0136*** 0.0079 
   (0.0032) (0.0068) 
Dome * Tenure - Elap. Time   0.0144** 0.0280** 
   (0.0058) (0.0087) 
Constant -3.4701***  -2.6447***  
 (0.2360)  (0.2318)  
     
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Labourer Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
Average marginal effects     
Tenure – Cum. Days     
       Dome = 0 0.0034***    
       Dome = 1 0.0054***    
Tenure – Elap. Time     
       Dome = 0   0.0022***  
       Dome = 1   0.0047***  
Num. of observations 19861 18921 19861 18921 
Num. of individuals 798  798  
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.158 0.136 0.157 
 
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in parentheses. Tenure given in 
percentile. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Column (2) presents estimates from a conditional logit specification with labourer fixed effects. 
The results are robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects, as the interaction effect 




Column (3) gives the results from a logit specification using the percentile rank of elapsed time 
as the measure of prior tenure. The results are similarly striking. A one quartile increase in a 
labourer’s tenure percentile rank in terms of elapsed time increases the probability of working 
full-time by 5.5 percentage points in before the dome construction (p < 0.01, 25*0.0022 = 0.055) 
and by 11.75 percentage points during dome construction (p < 0.01, 25*0.0047 = 0.1175).  
These results are robust to the inclusion of labourer fixed effects in column (4). 
 
 














Appendix D: Maintenance Period 
Most of the data collected represents the construction period of St. Paul’s through 1711. Less 
than 3% of the data in our panel is from the maintenance period. This appendix explores 
whether there was a change in the relationship between tenure and intensity of work during the 
maintenance period. 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table D.1 indicate that there was a significant relationship between 
tenure in terms of cumulative days worked and whether a labourer worked full-time during the 
maintenance period. The marginal effects in (2) indicate that a one quartile increase in the 
labourer’s percentile rank increases the probability of working full-time by 8.5 percentage points 
(p<0.05, 25*0.0033 = 0.0825). However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of labourer 
fixed effects in column (3), or to the elapsed time measure of tenure in columns (4)-(6). 
 
The relationship between tenure and whether a labourer worked more than 85% of the 
maximum days in an accounting period thus was weaker and possibly insignificant during the 
maintenance period.  
 
Table D.1: Probability of a labourer working full-time during maintenance period 
 

















(FE) - Coef 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Tenure - Cum. 
Days 
0.0178* 0.0033** 0.0042    
 (0.0079) (0.0013) (0.0263)    
Tenure - Elap. 
Time 
   0.0130 0.0025* 0.0057 
    (0.0071) (0.0012) (0.0211) 
Constant -0.9479   -0.6937   
 (0.5250)   (0.4775)   
Year Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed 
Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Labourer 
Fixed Effects 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Num. of 
observations 
545 545 456 545 545 456 
Num. of 
individuals 
54   54   
Pseudo R2 0.200  0.258 0.187  0.258 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by individual, are presented in 






Appendix E: The ranking of labourers in the accounts 
The organization of the accounts suggests that the clerk possessed a clear idea about who was to 
be hired and what they were entrusted with. In each period, hiring occurred in a sequence, with 
preferred workers taken on first. Long-term labourers were allotted a higher place in the queue 
for whatever work was available. The structure of the account also argues against the idea that 
labourers were being hired as gangs. 
 
We are able to observe this process because of how the clerk kept the accounts for the majority 
of the period. For seven years from 1675-1682, the accounts were organized alphabetically; this 
affects 21% of the series. Before and after this, however, the order of labourers’ names seems to 
reflect the order of hiring.29 The only exception to this is that first and last positions were 
sometimes determined by status, and were at times occupied by the foreman and clerk of works.  
 
The order in which the labourers’ names were given in the accounts was usually repeated 
consistently from month to month. This was not wholly mechanical. Labourers did change 
position. Figure E.1 illustrates this by showing the relationship between positions of labourers in 
the sequence of accounts in the four months between March 1687 and July 1687. Each sub-plot 
shows the position of an individual labourer in two sequential months. The labourers’ position in 
the first month is plotted along the x-axis. Their position in the second month is plotted on the 
y-axis. Each month saw some labourers arrive and some leave. The lines of points on the y-axis 
show groups of labourers being taken on, while labourers left individually – and so are scattered 
along the x-axis, as they have a position in the first month, but not the second. 
 






29 Some of the longer accounting records seem to contain several sequential lists of work, which can be identified by 
the repeated appearance of the labourer who appears to be acting as foreman and then the set of workers that 
follow. These have been treated as separate accounts for this analysis.  The watchmen’s shifts are listed separately 
after the labourers is finished, so those individuals appear twice in the account 
59 
 
The contrast between the two stages of arrival and departure provides good reason to reject the 
idea that labourers were being employed as gangs, with an internal management structure 
separate to their employer. While the hiring of gangs would be compatible with the pattern of 
clusters of labourers entering the account in a group. That separations were scattered across the 
list of labourers indicates that no group structure was maintained between workers within the 
site. We would expect workers to arrive and separate collectively if they were part of a gang. 
There is no sign of this. 
 
The relationship between tenure and access to work is discussed in depth in the text. Table E.1 
complements Table 5 in the main text, and shows how the different quartiles of the clerk’s list 
were composed of labourers with widely differing degrees of experience on the Cathedral. Only 
0.3% of labourers listed in the top quarter were new entrants to the workforce; 14% of those 
listed in the fourth quartile of people were new that period. At the other extreme, 93% of those 
listed in the top quartile of each account had been active for more than a year, as were 74% of 
those in the second quartile.  
 
 
Table E.1: placement of workers in the clerk’s list and time since entry 
 








  7-9 
months 
  10-12 
months 
    >1 
year % N 
Share of each quartile made up by labourers from each category (row) 
0-25 0.22 0.94 1.92 2.39 2.44 92.09 100.00 3,603 
26-50 1.53 7.17 7.28 6.85 6.14 71.03 100.00 3,793 
51-75 8.02 19.73 10.54 6.17 4.95 50.59 100.00 3,841 
76-100 7.05 7.85 4.64 2.99 2.99 74.49 100.00 3,645 
         
Total 4.24 9.07 6.18 4.65 4.17 71.7 100.00 14,882 
 
Note: table reports labourers recorded in non-alphabetical accounts produced during the period of construction 
 
 
 
 
 
